Combating Terrorism
A Proliferation of Strategies

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Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

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Introduction

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before you today. The Subcommittee has identified an important issue that merits serious consideration and debate. Strategy, at its core, is about linking ends and means. An optimum strategy identifies the limited resources, or means, at hand and provides the methods that enable them to be applied efficiently to achieve the ends desired. In the case of the Global War on Terrorism, the end sought by the United States is to reduce the terrorist threat to the point where "Americans and other civilized people around the world can lead their lives free of fear from terrorist attacks."[1] The country must put the lives of some Americans in harm's way achieve this end, and devote a substantial amount of its national treasure. These resources, although quite impressive, are finite. Moreover, they can only be spent once. If we choose the wrong strategy, or execute the right strategy ineffectively, we will have wasted both time and resources, neither of which can be recovered.

As the Subcommittee has noted, the Bush Administration has set forth a number of strategies for addressing the Global War on Terrorism. This raises several concerns. One is whether the strategies are logically consistent. Another is whether they, in fact, constitute a coherent strategy for achieving the end—victory in the war on terrorism—that we desire.

A thorough evaluation of these issues with respect to the various strategies cited by the Subcommittee would take considerable time and effort. Unfortunately, some important elements—such as the Bush Administration's budget and *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*—have only recently been released. *The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* is a classified document, and thus is not available for public inspection.

There is nothing inherently wrong with having a hierarchy of documents that provide a statement of our strategy at various levels of detail. In fact, this is what the Bush Administration seems to have done. The issues here are consistency and comprehension. One would expect, for example, the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (hereafter referred to as the *National Security Strategy*) to serve as a capstone document. Both the *National Homeland Security Strategy* (which, as its name indicates, addresses domestic aspects of the Global War on Terrorism) and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (which addresses the overseas aspects of the strategy) can focus more specifically on their part of the strategic mission, so long as they are consistent with the *National Security Strategy*, and identify how they are integrated, one with the other.

At a more detailed level, certain specific aspects of the larger strategy—those dealing with denying terrorists with access to weapons of mass destruction (i.e., The *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*), defend against cyber attacks (i.e., *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace*), and restrict terrorist access to financial

[1] National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p.1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf

resources (i.e., *The National Money Laundering Strategy*)—can provide comprehensive guidance on how the strategy is to be implemented. Again, the question of having a set of strategies is not one of propriety; rather, it concerns consistency with the broader strategic guidance and integration with the other associated elements of the strategy.[2]

Another matter to keep in mind in evaluating these strategies is that the practice of publicly proclaiming strategies for defeating one's enemies has clear limits. Public strategic statements are useful in focusing the attention and efforts of the nation. It can also reassure allies, and perhaps deter adversaries. However, there are limits to how much we want our enemies to know concerning how we plan to defeat them. Just as a football coach seeks to keep his game plan from the opposing coaching staff, and a chess master refuses to elaborate to his opponent on his strategy for the coming match, some details of our strategy for defeating terrorism should remain secret. This, of course, presents a dilemma for Congress, which must discharge its responsibility for providing the means to execute the strategy. However, Congress appropriates billions of dollars each year to so-called Black, or classified, defense programs. Thus it would seem that methods can be found that enable Congress to make informed judgments on the kind and scale of resources required to execute a strategy for the Global War on Terrorism.

I would now like to turn to the matter of the strategies themselves. Do they form a cohesive framework? Are they comprehensive? Have they eliminated gaps and duplications in programs? How will we know when the strategy is effective? Before providing some observations on these issues, it is worth examining the threat addressed in the strategies advanced by the administration.

The Nature of the Terrorist Threat

Following the attacks against New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the United States finds itself engaged in its first war of the 21st century. This war against international terrorist aggression—ancient in its origins, but new in its form and intensity—presents a very different set of challenges, and requires a wholly different response from the more traditional conflicts that have dominated America's recent history.

The United States now confronts radical Islamic terrorist organizations practicing "asymmetric warfare"—aligning their strengths against America's weaknesses, rather

[2] For example, to the extent that disrupting money laundering is considered an important part of the strategy to deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction, both *The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* and *The National Money Laundering Strategy* should not only be consistent with the higher-order strategic documents (e.g., *The National Security Strategy; The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*), but also with one another. Moreover, each strategy should explain the role it plays in the other's efforts; i.e., how the strategy for dealing with money laundering helps to address the challenge weapons of mass destruction, and how the strategy for denying terrorists access to WMD supports the strategy for denying terrorists money laundering (for example, as a means of organizing and transferring to enable WMD development, or for buying WMD).

than attacking the US military head-on, tank against tank, fighter against fighter.[3] This enemy sees America's long borders and open society as vulnerabilities that enable infiltration and attack coordination. Respect for the right of privacy and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, and the diversity of America's nationalities and faiths, are seen not as democracy's legacy, but rather as shields behind which to plan the next attack. The information revolution that has fueled much of the world's recent economic growth is exploited by this enemy to coordinate its attacks.

Radical Islamic terrorist movements in general and al Qaeda specifically seek to:

- Remove western influence (more specifically, US influence) from Islamic states. This would include US military influence (e.g., military bases; combined training exercises) and cultural influence; and

- Overthrow those regimes in Islamic states that do not follow the path of radical Islam, so as to establish radical Islamic regimes under their domination.

For their part, radical Islamic terrorist organizations have pursued a strategy of the weak, similar to those pursued by others engaged in insurgency warfare.[4] Realizing they are no match for the United States when it comes to conventional forms of military power, they have opted to pursue a cost-imposing strategy by threatening the United States itself, as well as US forces and facilities in the Middle East region.[5]

[3] To be sure, radical Islamic terrorist movements are not the only terrorist organizations that have the potential to threaten the US homeland and America's vital interests abroad. However, as measured by level of military effort and funding, they are the *de facto* focus of the administration's Global War on Terrorism, and for good reason. Radical Islamic terrorist organizations have been, by far, the principal source of terrorist activity directed against the United States over the last two decades.

[4] Indeed, it is more profitable to consider the threat posed by terrorist organizations like al Qaeda as an insurgency movement—albeit one that operates on a global scale and may have access to destructive capabilities far beyond those traditionally associated with insurgent movements. Just as insurgent movements seek to advance from acts of terrorism to guerrilla warfare involving larger forces, so too did US forces encounter al Qaeda military formations during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. While the attacks on the United States can be viewed from a number of perspectives, one intriguing possibility is that Osama bin Laden intended for the attacks, by their success, to trigger an uprising in the so-called Arab Street that would depose certain weak Islamic regimes in favor of al Qaeda-friendly governments. This recalls the Tet Offensive by the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War, in which the Communists attempted to trigger a collapse of support for the pro-US regime in Saigon. In both instances, the attackers were proven wrong about the level and depth of popular commitment to their cause.

[5] A cost-imposing strategy is one in which one of the competitors is forced to incur greatly disproportionate costs in order to offset a threat posed by its rival. For example, during the Cold War the US bomber force enabled the United States to pursue a cost-imposing strategy against the Soviet Union in that it cost Moscow far more to develop, field and operate its national air defense system than it did for the US Air Force to develop, field and maintain its bomber force. Similarly, the terrorist attacks of 9-11, which cost perhaps $1 million to mount, finds the United States spending tens of billions of dollars to prevent similar terrorist attacks.

In recent years, Islamic terrorists have moved to escalate the conflict both horizontally and vertically.[6] Horizontal escalation occurred when they expanded their attacks to the United States. The terrorists' willingness to target noncombatants has complicated the US defense problem even further, and also increased the cost of establishing effective defenses. The terrorists' strategy appears based on the premise that the United States will prove unwilling to bear these costs over the long term, producing a dramatic reduction or even withdrawal of US influence from the Middle East, paving the way for the victorious radical Islamic forces and rogue states to topple any local regime that opposes them. Hence the focus on cost-imposing strategies and challenging America's willingness to persist over the long haul.

The vertical escalation in the terrorists' campaign involves ratcheting up the level of violence to effect greater death and destruction. Their willingness—indeed, determination—to kill large numbers of noncombatants indiscriminately and their desire to use or acquire weapons of mass destruction is a critical characteristic of this conflict: the concentration of far greater destructive potential in the hands of small groups than has heretofore been the case.[7] This "Democratization of Destruction" may be facilitated not only by terrorist efforts to develop chemical, biological, and radiological weapons themselves, but also to acquire them through various sources. Of particular concern are the so-called Axis of Evil states.

The radical Islamic terrorist strategy has produced some positive results, particularly when contrasted with the conventional wars involving Islamic forces. Conventional conflicts such as the June 1967 Six-Day War and the 1991 Gulf War yielded Arab military disasters of historic proportions. By contrast, Hezbollah succeeded in coercing the US component of the Multilateral Force out of Lebanon in 1984 following the attack of a suicide truck bomber on the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, killing 241 marines.[8] Israel has found coping with terrorism difficult. Arguably, the Intifada campaigns contributed significantly to Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon and to Palestinian efforts to extract concessions from the Israeli government. In summary, radical Islamic terrorists have pursued a cost-imposing strategy within a protracted conflict which has produced what success the cause of Islamic fundamentalism has seen to date in its efforts to eliminate US influence and weaken, if not destroy, Israel.

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[6] Horizontal escalation refers to shifting the geographic focus of the conflict. The attacks of 9-11 marked a shift from attacking US facilities, citizens and forces overseas, to attacking the US homeland itself. Vertical escalation refers to increasing the intensity of the conflict. The strikes against the World Trade Center (in particular) and the Pentagon were intended to kill tens of thousands, far in excess of the casualties suffered in attacks such as those on Khobar Towers, the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, or the USS Cole. The 1993 terrorist attempt on the World Trade Center is a notable exception to this pattern.

[7] Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese terrorist organization, attempted to develop both chemical and biological agents, and to use them to create mass casualties. The United States was subjected to a number of terrorist anthrax attacks of unknown origin in the weeks following 9-11. During Operation Enduring Freedom evidence emerged of al Qaeda's attempts to obtain WMD, to include radiological weapons (e.g., "dirty bombs").

[8] The Multilateral Force comprised units of the American, British, French and Italian armed forces.

These are remarkably ambitious objectives for a terrorist organization. For many years, terrorists were a nuisance dealt with by a state's law enforcement capabilities. Why have they become such a problem now? The reason is that they may be gaining access to far more formidable means of destruction—to include weapons of mass destruction—than were available to terrorist groups only a few years ago. This effort may be aided and abetted by rogue and enabler states, which provide terrorists with sanctuary of one sort or another. It is a cruel irony that, as 9-11 shows, in addition to the havens provided by tyrannical regimes,[9] terrorists have also found sanctuary in democratic states. Countries such as Germany and America, where laws designed to protect a citizen's right of privacy and freedom of movement, were exploited to facilitate acts of terror.

A particular concern for the future is that rogue states, once they have acquired weapons of mass destruction, may through design or laxity allow terrorists access to them. In short, the terrorist threat to the United States cannot be viewed in isolation from those states that enable them. This includes states and institutions that, by accident or design, enable the financial flows that support terrorist organizations.

Of course, to the extent radical Islamic terrorist movements are successful, we may expect to see others imitate their strategy. The threat of terrorist attack on the US homeland may be adopted by other terrorist groups, or even states that covertly sponsor such groups for the purpose of conducting ambiguous aggression against the United States. Consequently, the United States must develop a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the terrorist threat, one that addresses not only terrorist organizations themselves, but their sponsors—witting and unwitting. As radical Islamic terrorist movements manifest many of the characteristics of an insurgency, any US strategy must address how the root causes that animated these movements in the first instance can be eliminated while preserving American principles and interests.

Strategic Shift: From Cold War to Hot Peace

During the first decade of the Cold War the United States debated a range of options for addressing the threat posed by the Soviet Union, which aggressively (and successfully) sought to develop nuclear weapons. Among the options considered were preventive war and preemptive attack. Preventive war was ruled out, primarily owing to the risks involved. The Eisenhower Administration's defense posture of Massive Retaliation saw military leaders planning for "Massive Preemption" in the event preparations for an imminent Soviet first-strike nuclear attack could be detected.[10] As the Soviet nuclear

[9] For example, Syria (along with Iran) supports Hezbollah, the Islamic terrorist group operating out of Lebanon. The group is responsible for the suicide bombing attack on the US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and of a series of kidnappings and murders of US officials. Iraq plotted the assassination of former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait in 1993, provided sanctuary to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, provides support to terrorist organizations such as Ansar al Islam, and offers subsidies to the families of Palestinian suicide terrorist bombers to encourage such attacks on Israel.

[10] McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival* (New York; Random House, 1988), p. 321; and Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset:' American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," *International Security*, Winter 1988/89, pp. 44-45. See also Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The*

arsenal grew, notions of preventive war or preemptive attack faded from senior policy debates. Eventually Washington settled on a strategy of containing communism, as represented by the Soviet bloc. This strategy was pursued through a military posture of deterrence and flexible (often interpreted as proportional) response in the event deterrence failed.

Washington continued to follow this strategy in the first decade following the Soviet Union's demise. Rogue states like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea were to be contained and deterred from committing aggression. The United States imposed economic and political sanctions against them roughly similar to those imposed on the Soviet Union.

The strategy has produced mixed results. No rogue state successfully engaged in aggression. However, terrorist organizations, and radical Islamic terrorist groups in particular, have not been deterred from executing a series of attacks on US forces and facilities abroad, to include the Khobar Towers attack in 1996, the bombing of US embassies in Africa in 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. An attempt to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993 was foiled. A second attempt, using hijacked airliners in September 2001, resulted in the destruction of both World Trade Center towers and coincided with a similar attack that damaged a major portion of the Pentagon. This was followed by a string of anthrax attacks, origins unknown, focused primarily on targets in the New York and Washington areas. Recent attacks include those against a French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen, against tourists in Bali and Kenya, and on an airliner in Kenya. Israel continues to be subjected to suicide terrorist attacks.

Whereas deterrence and containment worked well during the Cold War, the same cannot be said of their effectiveness against radical Islamic terrorist movements. Moreover, while terrorist attacks have not produced prompt results, they have proven to be a more effective challenge to US and allied interests than traditional forms of aggression, and are proving increasingly destructive. It is no small irony that deterrence worked far better against a superpower rival during the Cold War than it has against radical Islamic terrorist organizations, which are microscopically weak when compared to the Soviet Union. Islamic terrorist groups, who have no country to defend, and no industry or national infrastructure to lose, have proven poor targets for retaliation, as a series of US retaliatory strikes over the last two decades has demonstrated.[11]

Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 162, 164.

[11] US military operations in response to terrorist acts include the aborted Desert One hostage rescue mission in April 1980, naval bombardment and air strikes over Syria in December 1983, air strikes against Libya in 1986, cruise missile attacks against Iraq following the assassination plot against former President Bush in 1993, and cruise missile attacks against suspected terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998 following attacks on US embassies in Africa. No retaliatory strikes were conducted by the Clinton Administration for the terrorist attacks on US forces at Khobar Towers or against the USS Cole. One also recalls an attempt at what might be termed appeasement by the Reagan Administration in offering arms to the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for the release of US hostages being held by Islamic terrorist organizations with strong ties to Teheran.

Until recently, it might have been argued that even if deterrence had failed against such groups, the damage sustained would be relatively minor. In the wake of 9-11, that argument is more difficult to make. Moreover, the Bush Administration argues that Iranian and Iraqi state efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, combined with their association or sponsorship of terrorist organizations, means the risk of terrorists obtaining access to WMD for their use is significant and growing. Should terrorists gain access to advanced biotoxins or nuclear weapons, their ability to wreak destruction would increase dramatically. Given the United States' failure to dissuade countries like Iran and Iraq from pursuing WMD, and its failure to deter terrorist attacks against its interests overseas and its homeland, the Bush Administration now finds itself seeking other remedies in the wake of deterrence's failure.

In the global war on terrorism—against al Qaeda, specifically—the United States has accepted that relying on deterrence, and its threat of retaliation, to prevent future attacks, is a dead end strategy. In its place, Washington has embraced preemption—destroying al Qaeda elements wherever they can be found, before they can undertake yet another strike.[12] At the same time, Washington also declared that states sponsoring terrorist organizations with global reach (e.g., al Qaeda) would also be liable to attack.

The administration's strategy accepts the fact that the United States is already at war with al Qaeda and likely other terrorist groups, and thus must pursue a war-winning strategy. The administration also realizes that it must also address the danger posed by those states who offer sanctuary and support to such terrorist organizations, either consciously or unwittingly. Finally, the administration recognizes that it must not only deal with the symptoms of the terrorist movements—armed terrorist attackers—but the root causes—political, economic and social—that spawned terrorism in the first place

A Proliferation of Strategies

The Bush Administration has responded aggressively to terrorist attacks of 9-11 and those that followed. Al Qaeda's principal base in Afghanistan was attacked and its terrorist forces scattered. Enormous resources are being devoted to wage war against al Qaeda and associated groups, and to better prepare for the longer-term terrorist threat. Major new organizations have been created to address the challenge. In the largest restructuring of the US Government since the 1947 National Security Act that established the organizational basis for the 40-year struggle with the Soviet Union, Congress established the Department of Homeland Security. A military structure—Northern Command—has been created to organize America's homeland defenses. These are impressive initiatives. They reflect both a determination to prosecute the war vigorously, and to devote a remarkable amount of resources to provide for America's security.

There is, however, another matter that must be addressed: a strategy that links the means with their purpose, which is to win the Global War on Terrorism. The Bush

[12] This may be an overstatement. After all, if the United States is already at war with al Qaeda, preemption in the traditional sense is not really what is occurring. Rather, the US military is attempting to defeat an enemy before he can marshal his forces for yet another attack.

Administration has developed what can be described as a series of strategies related to how to prosecute the war. The various strategies include the:

- *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*
- *National Homeland Security Strategy*
- *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*
- *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*
- *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*
- *National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace;* and the
- *National Money Laundering Strategy*

Although at first blush this plethora of strategies appears daunting, there is nothing inherently wrong with having multiple strategies, or sub-strategies, as long as they are logically consistent. What is also important, of course, is that the strategies provide a comprehensive method for applying the means available—and those being requested—to the task at hand: winning the Global War on Terrorism.

Such a strategy must also elaborate on the roles and responsibilities of the relevant departments and agencies of the federal government, their relationship with state and local governments, and the linkages between the United States, it allies, and various nonstate actors (e.g., international institutions, corporate America).

Much to Applaud—Much to Be Done

The Bush Administration deserves credit for its efforts to tackle the multidimensional aspects of the Global War on Terrorism, both in terms of developing strategies that provide a blueprint for addressing the threat, in its efforts to restructure our organizations to deal with the threat, and in requesting resources that will enable these organizations to execute its strategy.

While the administration may deserve an "A for effort," however, the fact remains that such the dramatic reorientation of the US national security strategy, to include the structure and resources for executing it, will not be easily accomplished. One only needs to recall the effort required in the late 1940s and early 1950s by the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations to come to grips with the threat posed by the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the development of nuclear weapons. While the Defense Department was created through the National Security Act of 1947, it took until 1958 before its structure was refined (and even then only partially) to address the new circumstances in which America found itself. And even though the Soviet threat was identified at the end of World War II, it took the United States five years, until 1950,

before the famous NSC-68 strategy of containment was developed to guide its efforts in the long-term competition. The bottom line is that we should be under no illusion that the administration's set of strategies is anything more than a start on the serious intellectual work that must be done to develop a refined strategy for what is almost certain to be a protracted conflict against transnational terrorist organizations with global reach.

Unanswered Questions

As noted earlier, given time and security constraints, I was unable to undertake a comprehensive review of the strategies prior to this hearing. However, based on a preliminary assessment, it is possible to raise some issues for consideration.

Preemptive Attack. The administration's strategy calls for preemptive attacks on terrorist organizations planning attacks on the United States. For example, intelligence may provide information on the whereabouts of terrorist leaders, or on the production of weapons of mass destruction. The former target is fleeting, while the latter target may require special targeting.[13]

This implies an ability to act quickly and strike without warning and over great distances. It may also require special capabilities or weapons. In such instances, where time is short and maintaining the element of surprise is key, the United States will not have the luxury of negotiating access to forward bases or moving forces into the region prior to executing its preemptive attack. The administration's move to increase the size of US Special Forces fits this strategy well. However, there also appear to be several disconnects. For example, Special Forces conducting preemptive strikes will likely need stealthy means for insertion and extraction. The Navy's conversion of Trident ballistic missile submarines to carry significant numbers of Special Forces may provide a partial solution. What is lacking is a commitment to stealthy means of aerial insertion and extraction. Similarly, the Air Force plans to purchase over 2,000 short-range tactical aircraft, which will require access to forward bases for their operation. Yet the Service has no plans to produce any long-range bombers over the next several decades.

Border Security. The strategies do not provide guidance in any great detail as to how America intends to maintain control over its borders against the infiltration of terrorists or weapons—weapons of mass destruction in particular. Take the issue of ports. There are a number of possible options for providing port security. One is to place the burden on securing cargo containers on the port of origin. The United States might certify certain overseas ports as meeting certain US-established security standards. Container ships carrying such certified cargo containers might have their offloading process expedited (think of the E-Z Pass toll lanes on highways). Those that arrive from uncertified ports would be subjected to rigorous inspections.

[13] Of course, it is possible that these threats might be identified in a country that is allied to the United States in the Global War on Terrorism. If so, that country, perhaps with US assistance, could deal with the danger.

Another alternative would be for US intelligence services to monitor cargo shipped from ports in hostile or unstable states. Suspicious cargo ships could be monitored by a "Maritime NORAD" which might intercept and search ships on the high seas, much as the North Korean ship carrying ballistic missiles was searched recently near the Persian Gulf. Yet another alternative would be to place most of the responsibility for port security on local governments at the US point of entry. Or, over the longer term, it may be possible to use mobile offshore ports, based on oil platform technology, as a means of safely screening incoming cargo at sea before it proceeds to coastal ports.

There are yet other options, and combinations of options are possible, too. In short, a good strategy would set forth how port security is to be achieved.

Damage Limitation. A key part of the administration's strategy is to limit the damage arising from a terrorist attack on the United States. This ability is a function of the scale of effort (e.g., the size of the organizations—first responders, decontamination elements, the National Guard, etc.—involved in consequence management), their level of training (i.e., their effectiveness) and how quickly they can be brought to bear on the area attacked. One strategic option for addressing this challenge is to place responsibility primarily with state or even local governments, to include the funding and physical assets. Another option would be to place responsibility primarily with the federal government, to include funding and physical assets. The former offers the advantage of assets optimized for local conditions. The latter offers the advantage of being able to mobilize far larger forces much more quickly to limit the damage of an attack.

An example may serve to make the point. Assume there are 100 cities in the United States at risk of terrorist attack. The former option would allocate resources on a per capita basis to each municipality to be employed as it best sees fit. The latter option would find the federal government emphasizing the placement of resources in the highest risk cities, and also in those cities that could serve as regional transportation hubs for rapid reinforcement of damage limitation forces at other cities.

In short, the federal government would allocate resources on a threat basis, not a per capita basis. Moreover, it would position these resources in a manner that would enable the government to rapidly dispatch damage limitation forces to any city that had been subjected to attack. The latter option, or strategy, assumes that terrorists cannot mount attacks in all 100 cities simultaneously. It thus provides an initial defense capability for each city (i.e., first responders) while relying on its ability to mobilize and deploy quickly external forces to enhance the city's defense, should it be attacked.

The strategic option chosen has major consequences. If the former is chosen, it will be much more difficult to achieve a high level of damage limitation than in the latter case, where resources can more easily be mobilized and committed. If the latter case is chosen, greater emphasis will have to be given on the means for rapid transport (i.e., airlift). The latter option also assumes federal responsibility for a significant part of the training of such organizations.

There are still other issues that should be addressed in the process of refining the administration's strategies for combating terrorism.

The Role of Allies. We are truly in an era of ad hoc coalitions. We need allies for the war on terrorism, but we will need them for different kinds of support than in the past. Areas such as human intelligence, special operations, maritime interdiction and stability operations are likely to take on greater prominence. The extent to which we fashion coalitions and identify a division of labor among these mission areas can help inform the mix of capabilities the United States must maintain or develop to implement its strategy.

Strategic Phases. It is difficult to discern whether the administration's strategies are to be pursued in phases, or simultaneously. This is important as the effectiveness of execution may depend on certain things being accomplished before others are initiated (e.g., establishing US port security mechanisms while other options—such as port of departure controls or the use of offshore ports—are being developed).

Competitive Strategies. The administration's strategies discuss US strengths in the Global War on Terrorism and how they might be exploited. Competitive strategies takes this concept one step further and asks how America's enduring competitive advantages might be aligned to exploit terrorist enduring weaknesses to the United States' advantage within the context of a long-term competition. This strategic concept, which was developed to deal with the enduring Soviet threat during the Cold War, may have important applications in this new protracted conflict. Far less is mentioned in the strategies concerns how the terrorists might pursue their own competitive strategies. A good strategy not only takes into account what might be done to exploit US advantages, but also what can be done to mitigate US weaknesses.

Cost-Imposing Strategies. The attacks on 9-11 not only brought the war on terrorism home to the American people, it also represents a cost-imposing strategy for terrorists. A cost-imposing strategy is one in which one of the competitors is forced to incur greatly disproportionate costs in order to offset a threat posed by its rival. The terrorist attacks of 9-11, which cost perhaps $1 million to mount, led to the United States spending tens of billions of dollars attempting to erect defenses against terrorist attacks. At least one of the administration's strategies should address where the United States is vulnerable to cost-imposing strategies, and how this vulnerability might be mitigated or offset. This is particularly important in protracted conflicts, where the costs borne must also be endured over a long period. Similarly, the strategy should address options for pursuing cost-imposing strategies against terrorists. The matter of cost-imposing strategies is one area that is particularly suitable for security classification.

Planting the Garden. To the extent that radical Islamic terrorism represents an insurgent movement, dealing with it requires more than denying these groups sanctuaries from which to mount attacks on the United States. It also involves attacking the root causes that spawned the terrorist movement in the first instance. These causes are typically political, economic or social in nature. Because the problems are deep-rooted, they are not often quickly ameliorated. This is another reason why the Global War on Terrorism is

almost certain to be protracted in nature. The Bush Administration's strategies discuss the issue, but only in passing. There is little meat on the bones of this important element of the strategy. A strong case can be made that a strategy for stability operations is just as important as, say, a strategy for dealing with illegal financial flows.

Conclusion

My tentative conclusions, based on a limited, preliminary assessment of the administration's strategies are that:

- They represent an important initial effort to come to grips with perhaps the most dramatic shift in the threat environment encountered by the United States since the dawn of the Cold War.

- While in many instances the effort is impressive; it also is incomplete. *This may also be because significant portions of the strategy are classified—and rightly so.* Thus, given historical experience, these strategies should be viewed as initial steps on the road to developing a comprehensive strategy for the long-term Global War on Terrorism.

- Consequently, a major intellectual effort should be undertaken toward this end.